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PROSPECTIVE INJUNCTIONS AND FEDERAL LABOR LAW POLICY:
OF FUTURE STRIKES, ARBITRATION, AND EQUITY
I. Introduction
The problem of fairness in the handling of disputes between labor and
management has long vexed courts of law and equity. Legislative and judicial
policies have alternatively seemed to favor first one side and then the other.' It
is not surprising, therefore, to find a four-way division among the United States
Courts of Appeals over a rarely used but highly controversial instrument of labor
law enforcement, the prospective injunction.2 When called upon to determine
the propriety of prospectively enjoining strikes over disputes covered by the bind-
ing arbitration clause of a collective bargaining agreement, each of these four
circuits has adopted its-own distinct position: The Seventh Circuit has broadly
approved the use of a prospective injunction,' while the Fifth Circuit has strongly
disapproved of the use of such a device.4 The Tenth and Third Circuits have
opted for a middle position, each giving only qualified approval.5
Though perhaps not surprising, this conflict among the circuits is nonethe-
less significant. It is especially important because in each case the court involved
was dealing with essentially the same collective bargaining agreement.' This
common element serves to highlight both the importance of analyzing this con-
flict and the need for its resolution; the fact that an issue arising under the same
basic collective bargaining agreement has been treated differently by the various
courts directly affects the viability of collective bargaining between nationally
based unions and employers. Clearly at stake is the Supreme Court's policy
favoring the arbitration of grievances and promoting a uniform treatment of
federal labor law.'
The purpose of this note is to analyze the conflict and to offer some sug-
gestions toward its resolution. In the course of that analysis, the nature and use
of prospective injunctions will be explored, as will the problems raised by the
use of these extraordinary remedial instruments. In order to conduct that
exploration adequately, however, it is first necessary to discuss the relevant leg-
1 The relevant history of labor-management disputes and the application of injunctive
remedies will be discussed infra.
2 The term "prospective injunction" refers to an order enjoining a party from thefuture commission of such acts as are named in the order. For an example of such an order,
see United States Steel Corp. v. UMW, 393 F. Supp. 936, 940-41 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
3 Old Ben Goal Corp. v. UMW Local 1487, 500 F.2d 950 (7th Cir. 1974).
4 United States Steel Corp. v. UMW, 519 F.2d 1236 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96
S. Ct. 3221 "(1976).
5 The Tenth and Third Circuit decisions were rendered in CF&I Steel Corp. v. UMW,
507 F.2d 170 (10th Cir. 1974); and United States Steel Corp. v. UMW, 534 F.2d 1063 (3d
Cir. 1976), respectively.
6 Although the facts giving rise to each case differed, the basic contract involved in each
one was the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement, particularly the 1971 and 1974
versions. There is no "significant" difference in the relevant parts of the 1968, 1971, and
1974 versions. United States Steel Corp. v. UMW, 534 F.2d 1063, 1069-71 (3d Cir. 1976).
For the actual text of the relevant sections, see id. at 1070, n.11.
7 See Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 246, 249 (1970);
see also the Steelworkers Trilogy: Steelworkers Union v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564
(1960); Steelworkers Union v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); Steel-
workers Union v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
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islative and judicial treatment of injunctions in federal labor law.
II. Injunctions and the Policy of Federal Labor Law
A. The Legislative Background
Labor history prior to 1932 is characterized by the rather liberal issuance
of injunctions.8 Without the guidance of statutes, courts were for the most part
free to conduct what has been referred to as "government by injunction."9
Largely in response to the federal judiciary's actions,10 Congress enacted the
Norris-LaGuardia Act in 1932." Section 4 of that Act essentially withdrew
from federal courts the power to issue injunctive relief against strikes.?
Similarly, passage of the Wagner Act' in 1935 imposed extensive and detailed
controls on labor-management relations in industry, which further enhanced the
strength of labor unions. In 1947, however, congressional policy shifted markedly
to an emphasis on collective bargaining, as evidenced by the enactment of the
Labor-Management Relations Act (the Taft-Hartley Act) over a Presidential
veto. 4 Section 301 (a) of this statute granted federal courts jurisdiction over
suits between employers and labor organizations involving violations of collective
bargaining agreements.' The Taft-Hartley Act, however, did not repeal the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, and the apparent incompatibility of these two Acts has
often occasioned Supreme Court decisions aimed at clarification of their relation-
ship.
B. Judicial Interpretation
The Supreme Court began this clarification process in Textile Workers
Union v. Lincoln Mills.'6 An employer refused a union's request to arbitrate a
dispute even though the collective bargaining agreement between them provided
a special grievance procedure which expressly included arbitration." The
Supreme Court held that the district court had properly decreed specific per-
formance in the suit, which had been brought under § 301 (a) of the Labor-
Management Relations Act." Moreover, the Court added that the appropriate
law to be applied in § 301 (a) suits was federal law. It called on the courts to
fashion that law from the policy of the national labor laws,'" stating that "[t]he
range of judicial inventiveness will be determined by the nature of the
problem."2 It was also in Lincoln Mills that the Court first pointed out the
close relationship between arbitration clauses and no-strike provisions, saying:
8 See, e.g., F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930).
9 Id.
10 Comment, Boys Market: Developments in the Third Circuit, 48 TEmp. L.Q. 281, 285
(1975).
11 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1970).
12 29 U.S.C. § 104 '(1970). See note 34, infra.
13 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. (1970).
14 29 U.S.C. §§ 141 et seq. (1970).
15 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1970).
16 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
17 Id. at 449.
18 Id. at 44956.
19 Id. at 456.
20 Id. at 457.
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Plainly the agreement to arbitrate grievance disputes is the quid pro quo
for an agreement not to strike. Viewed in this light, [§ 301(a)] does more
than confer jurisdiction in federal courts over labor organizations. It ex-
presses a federal policy that federal courts should enforce these agreements
on behalf of or against labor organizations and that industrial peace can be
best obtained only in that way.21
That the arbitration of grievances was to be the linchpin of a national labor
policy was further articulated in three 1960 cases collectively referred to as the
Steelworkers Trilogy.2 2 The Court noted that in § 301 (a) suits a court was not
to weigh the merits of the grievance;2" rather, its purpose should be "confined
to ascertaining whether the party seeking arbitration is making a claim which
on its face is governed by the contract.""' The test employed was to be a broad
one:
In the absence of any express provision excluding a particular grievance
from arbitration, we think only the most forceful evidence of a purpose to
exclude the claim from arbitration can prevail, particularly where, as here,
the exclusion clause is vague and the arbitration clause quite broad. 25
Two years later, Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co.", presented a situ-
ation in which an employer sought damages in a state court following a union
strike. The governing contract contained a binding arbitration agreement but
did not have a no-strike clause. 27 The state court awarded damages to the em-
ployer, applying principles of state law in finding the strike to be a violation of
the collective bargaining agreement. 28 While the Supreme Court upheld the
award, it did so on federal grounds, dispensing with the state court's reasoning.
In so doing, the Court noted that in § 301 (a) suits, "Congress intended doctrines
of federal labor law uniformly to prevail over inconsistent local ruies."' 9 An-
nouncing the correct federal grounds, the Court ruled that since the strike was
over a dispute subject to compulsory arbitration under the collective bargaining
agreement, the strike itself was in violation of that agreement regardless of the
absence of an expressed no-strike provision."s The Court indicated that a con-
trary view would be at odds with the basic policy of national labor legislation,
which promoted the arbitral process as a substitute for economic warfare."3
Shortly thereafter, however, the Supreme Court itself announced a decision
which appeared contradictory to the newly espoused "basic policy." By a narrow
margin,' 2 the Court in Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson" held that an injunction
21 Id. at 455.
22 The cases included in this trilogy are cited in note 7, supra.
23 Steelworkers Union v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568 (1960).
24 Id.
25 ' Steelworkers Union v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 584-85 (1960).
26 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
27 Relevant contract provisions are set out in 369 U.S. at 96.
28 Id. at 97-98. The state court said the strike violated the contract '"ecause it was an
attempt to coerce the employer to forego his contractual right to discharge an employee for
unsatisfactory work." Id.
29 Id. at 104.
30 Id. at 105.
31 Id.
32 The actual vote was 5-3. Justice Frankfurter took no part in the consideration or
decision of the case. 370 U.S. 195, 215 (1962).
33 370 U.S. 195 (1962).
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issued in a § 301(a) suit brought against the union for striking in violation of
no-strike and binding arbitration clauses itself violated § 4 of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act3" and was therefore invalid. The rationale was that Congress had
not intended to repeal § 4 of the Norris-La Guardia Act when it passed § 301 (a)
of the Labor-Management Relations Act; thus § 4 remained completely in force
and barred such an injunction. 5 The Court in effect said that if Congress had
not intended this result, correction would have to come through legislation and
not through judicial interpretation."
The situation was further complicated in Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge 735."
In that case, the Court ruled that a § 301 (a) suit brought in a state court could
be removed to a federal district court through application of the federal removal
statute.3 " In light of the Sinclair holding, this decision worked strongly to the
union's advantage. By empowering a union to compel removal of an employer's
§ 301 (a) suit, Avco had the effect of extending the Norris-LaGuardia Act to
state cases. Once in federal court, that Act, coupled with Sinclair, barred the
issuance of an injunction.
As a result of this doctrinal evolution, the Court in 1970 was faced with
the choice of either directly extending the Norris-LaGuardia Act to the states
or restricting its application. In the landmark case of Boys Markets, Inc. v.
Retail Clerks Local 770,"9 the Court chose the latter course. The employer, Boys
Markets, sought injunctive relief after the union had violated the no-strike clause
of the collective bargaining agreement. Furthermore, the strike was over a
dispute covered by the contract's binding arbitration clause."0 Overruling
Sinclair, the Supreme Court found that the injunction was not barred by Norris-
LaGuardia." Admitting that its Avco decision had created an anomalous situa-
tion, the Court noted that Congress had intended § 301 (a) to supplement, not to
encroach upon, the jurisdiction of state courts which had existed prior to the
enactment of the Labor-Management Relations Act."2 The Court further
declared that extending the Sinclair holding to the states would be unacceptable,
since the unavailability of equitable remedies would have "devastating implica-
tions" for the enforcement of arbitration agreements and concomitant no-strike
obligations.4 Having found an action for damages to be no substitute for an im-
mediate halt to an illegal strike, 4 the Court went on to say:
34 No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order
or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of any
labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons participating or interested in such
dispute (as these terms are herein defined) from doing, whether singly or in concert,
any of the following acts:
*(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation of
employment....
29 U.S.C. § 104 (1970).
35 370 U.S. 195, 203.
36 Id. at 214.
37 390 U.S. 557 (1968).
38 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1970).
39 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
40 Id. at 238-40.
41 Id. at 253.
42 Id. at 244-45.
43 Id. at 247.
44 Id. at 248.
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Even if management is not encouraged by the unavailability of the injunc-
tion remedy to resist arbitration agreements, the fact remains that the
effectiveness of such agreements would be greatly reduced if injunctive
relief were withheld. Indeed, the very purpose of arbitration procedures is
to provide a mechanism for the expeditious settlement of industrial disputes
without resort to strikes, lockouts, or other self-help measures. This basic
purpose is obviously largely undercut if there is no immediate, effective
remedy for those very tactics that arbitration is designed to obviate. Thus,
because Sinclair, in the aftermath of Avco, casts serious doubt upon the
effective enforcement of a vital element of stable labor-management re-
lations-arbitration agreements with their attendant no-strike obligations-
we conclude that Sinclair does not make a viable contribution to federal
labor policy.45
Citing Lincoln Mills, the Steelworkers Trilogy, and Lucas Flour in support
of its declaration of a national policy favoring arbitration, 6 the Court noted
that it was the task of the judiciary to accommodate older statutes with more
recent ones.47 Thus, it was proper for the Court to find that the policy of non-
intervention by the federal courts, articulated in the Norris-LaGuardia Act, had
to yield to what the Court termed the "overriding interest in the successful im-
plementation of the arbitration process." ' Nevertheless, the Court construed
its holding narrowly and indicated no intention of undermining the vitality of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act. 9 The application of Boys Markets was to be restricted
to instances in which collective bargaining contracts contained a mandatory
grievance adjustment or arbitration procedure. Guidelines first urged in the dis-
sent to Sinclair were adopted to aid the district courts in their implementation
of this decision."
Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW5 provided the Court with an opportunity to
expand on the self-declared narrow holding of Boys Markets. Whereas in Boys
Markets the Court had dealt with a contract containing both a binding arbitra-
tion agreement and a no-strike clause, Gateway Coal involved only a binding
arbitration agreement.2 Focusing on this basic difference, the Court nonetheless
found injunctive relief available on the basis of an implied no-strike agreement."
Once again noting the strong federal policy in favor of labor dispute arbitration,"
the Court announced that unless there was an explicit expression of an intention
not to have a broad mandatory arbitration clause imply a no-strike obligation,
45 Id. at 249.
46 Id. at 252.
47 Id. at 251.
48 Id. at 252.
49 Id. at 253. For a discussion of this "narrowness," see text accompanying notes 158
et seq., infra.
50 Id. at 254. It is of some interest to note that both the dissent in Sinclair and the
majority opinion in Boys Markets were written by Justice Brennan. A comprehensive list of
the principles adopted as guidelines in Boys Markets and in later Supreme Court cases is
provided infra in the text accompanying notes 66-74.
51 414 U.S. 368 (1974).
52 The contract in question was none other than the National Bituminous Coal Wage
A$reement of 1968. 414 U.S. at 374. The Court noted the broad character of the binding
arbitration clause, here deciding that the dispute-one involving the continued presence of two
foremen in the mine who faced disciplinary action-was covered by the arbitration clause and
that therefore the union was required to arbitrate. Id. at 376.
53 Id. at 381.
54 Id. at 382.
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the agreement to arbitrate and the duty not to strike were to be construed as
applying coterminously.55 Furthermore, finding the federal policy favoring
arbitration of labor disputes to be firmly grounded in congressional command,"
the Court reiterated what it termed the "now well-known presumption of arbi-
trability for labor disputes"57 :
An order to arbitrate the particular grievance should not be denied unless
it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not
susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. Doubts
should be resolved in favor of coverage.5s
Thus the Court expressly adopted this pre-Boys Markets presumption and ap-
plied it in a case where a Boys Markets injunction was sought.5 9
In its most recent pronouncement on the meaning of Boys Markets, the
Court re-emphasized that before a Boys Markets injunction can issue, the strike
must be over a dispute covered by the arbitration clause of the collective bargain-
ing agreement. Buffalo Forge Co. v. Steelworkers Union" was an attempt to
clarify this "over an arbitrable dispute" requirement. The case involved a
sympathy strike, and the Court found it improper to enjoin such a strike, since
to do so would cut too deeply into the still viable § 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act.6 As the district court had found, the strike was not over a dispute even
remotely subject to the coverage of the arbitration clause." Indeed, the issue
involved was the sympathy strike itself;6" this took it out of the control of Boys
Markets.64 The Court distinguished between a strike over an arbitrable dispute
and a strike which itself produced an arbitrable dispute, the former falling
within the Boys Markets rule and the latter without. In the course of so holding,
the Court summarized the rationale behind Boys Markets injunctions:
Striking over an arbitrable dispute would interfere with and frustrate the
arbitral processes by which the parties had chosen to settle a dispute.
The quid pro quo for the employer's promise to arbitrate was the union's
obligation not to strike over issues that were subject to the arbitration
machinery. Even in the absence of an express no-strike clause, an under-
taking not to strike would be implied where the strike was over an otherwise
arbitrable dispute. [citing Gateway Coal and Lucas Flour] Otherwise, the
employer would be deprived of his bargain and the policy of the labor
statutes to implement private resolution of disputes in a manner agreed
upon would seriously suffer.6 5
55 Id.
56 Id. at 377. The court here quoted § 203(d) of the Labor-Management Relations Act,
29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1970), which states in part:
Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is declared to be the
desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the application or
interpretation of an existing collective-bargaining agreement.
57 414 U.S. at 277.
58 Id., quoting from Steelworkers Union v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574,
582-83 (1960).
59 414 U.S. 368, 379-80, 387.
60 96 S. Ct. 3141 "(1976).
61 Id. at 3148-49.
62 Id. at 3147.
63 Id. at 3148.
64 Id. at 3147.
65 Id.
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C. Current Requirements for a Boys Markets Injunction
Combining the decisions in Boys Markets, Gateway Coal, and Buffalo
Forge, it is apparent that a number of requirements must be satisfied before a
Boys Markets injunction may issue. First, the collective bargaining agreement
must be found to contain a no-strike clause, either expressed or implied."8 It
must also be determined that a breach of that clause is occurring and will con-
tinue, or has been threatened and will be committed.6" The collective bargaining
agreement must contain a mandatory grievance adjustment or arbitration pro-
cedure. 8 The strike sought to be enjoined must be over a dispute falling within
the arbitration clause,6" but there is a presumption of arbitrability 0 The em-
ployer has to be prepared to proceed with arbitration at the time the injunction
is sought and obtained. 1 Additionally, it must be shown that the breach of the
binding arbitration and no-strike clauses has caused or will cause irreparable
injury to the employer,72 and the employer has to demonstrate that he will suffer
more from a denial of the injunction than the union will from its issuance.7
Finally, the employer must be ordered to arbitrate as a condition to the obtaining
of an injunction against the strike.74
III. The Prospective Injunction
It is apparent from this brief review of the role of injunctions in federal
labor law that the process of determining the propriety and delimiting the bound-
aries of injunctions is not a simple one. Nor is it a process which is by any
means complete, for it is from this history that the question of prospective in-
junctions has arisen.
Prospective-type injunctions are not entirely new to labor law. In a situation
where it was shown that past picketing was connected with acts of violence, an
injunction which in effect banned all picketing for the remaining life of the
contract was approved by the Supreme Court. 5 But as the Third Circuit
observed when called upon to resolve the issue, the question of prospectively
enjoining the right to strike itself is actually one of first impression. 6
In a sense, all injunctions are somewhat prospective in nature, for their
purpose is to prevent the occurrence of future violations and unlawful activity.7
What distinguishes a prospective Boys Markets injunction is the effect of the
injunction's operation. In the typical injunction situation, 8 a union is enjoined
from continuing a strike which it has begun as the result of a particular dispute.
66 398 U.S. 235, 248, n.16; 414 U.S. 368, 381.
67 398 U.S. 235, 253.
68 Id. at 253.
69 Id. at 254; 96 S. Ct. 3146.
70 414 U.S. 368, 377.
71 398 U.S. 235, 254.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Milk Wagon Drivers Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287 (1941).
76 United States Steel Corp. v. UM3W, 534 F.2d 1063, 1075 (3d Cir. 1976).
77 See, e.g., United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326 (1952). "The
sole function of an action for injunction is to forestall future violations." Id. at 333.
78 See the text accompanying notes 16-74, supra.
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When a prospective injunction issues, however, the Court finds that strikes over
a certain type of dispute have occurred in the past, and orders the union to
refrain from striking over future disputes of a similar nature. While both types
of injunctions are essentially attempts to compel the use of agreed-upon arbitra-
tion procedures instead of economic warfare, the prospective injunction is
principally aimed at future compliance. Thus, if a dispute of the type covered by
the prospective injunction arises in the future and the union strikes over it, the
union thereby violates a standing court order and is thus immediately liable for
contempt citation. Without an order phrased broadly enough to cover such
future disputes, the union can be enjoined only after it actually strikes."9 Since,
as a practical matter, the union is given some time to comply with an order before
a contempt citation is issued, the result is that such a strike, even if ultimately
enjoined, is not without economic significance to the employer. Indeed, it is
mainly to counteract the effect of a series of such strikes that the prospective
injunction device is used.
Of the four circuit court cases reviewed below, it is significant to note that
in each the district court issued a prospective injunction only when confronted
by a series of strikes by the union. Furthermore, each lower court found that the
issuance of a regular injunction would be ineffective in halting that series of
illegal strikes. Thus, it was against the continuation of a pattern of illegal strikes
that the prospective injunctions were issued. The propriety of those injunctions
in light of legal precedents and practical effects was the exact question which
confronted four circuits of the Court of Appeals.
IV. The Conflict over Prospective Injunctions:
Four Circuit Court Views
It is important to note initially the presence of a number of elements com-
mon to each court of appeals case: The various disputes in question arose under
essentially the same collective bargaining contract, the National Bituminous
Coal Wage Agreement."0 Before any of the district courts issued a prospective
injunction, they affirmatively found the existence of a series of strikes over issues
covered by the binding arbitration provisions of the contract. The appellant
union in each case was the United Mine Workers, and it opposed the prospective
injunction on the grounds of Boys Markets, the Norris-LaGuardia Act, and
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d). Furthermore, each of the prospective
injunctions under review had first been sought under § 301 (a) of the Labor-
Management Relations Act."' Finally, and perhaps most significantly, each court
had before it the same set of judicial precedents 2 and statutes on which to base
79 One way of looking at the difference is that in the usual case, there is nothing to en-
join until the union actually goes out on strike. Prospective injunctions effectively enjoin
continuance of a pattern of illegal strikes by ordering the union not to strike over disputes
arising in the future if those disputes are of a type specified in the injunction.
80 See note 6, supra.
81 See note 15 and the accompanying text, supra.
82 Gateway Coal was decided on January 8, 1974, and the Seventh Circuit case of Old Ben
Coal II, the first of the four, was decided on August 2, 1974. 414 U.S. 368; 500 F.2d 950. The
Third Circuit decision came down on March 16, 1976, and Buffalo Forge was decided on July
6, 1976. 534 F.2d 1063; 96 S. Ct. 3141. Buffalo Forge was announced the same day as was
the denial of certiorari to the appeal from the Fifth Circuit case. See 96 S. Ct. 3221 (1976).
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its decision.8"
A. The Seventh Circuit
The prospective injunction question first arose before the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit amid an exasperating factual situa-
tion. In Old Ben Coal Corp. v. UMW Local 1487 (Old Ben Coal I),"' the court
had affirmed the order of the district court enjoining the union from striking, but
it had narrowed the broad scope of that order, applying it only to strikes over
disputes that were actually before the court.8" It had in effect warned the union
that a broader order might be appropriate in some future action, however."
Following the Old Ben Coal I decision, the union continued to strike over various
disputes, walking out eight more times.88 In one of these instances, the employer
sought and was granted a temporary injunction, later made permanent by the
district court.88 The permanent injunction not only forbade the union from
striking over the particular dispute 'which had precipitated the temporary in-
junction, but it enjoined all work stoppages and strikes resulting from any other
differences or local troubles which the parties were obligated to arbitrate." It
was the scope of this injunction that prompted the union appeal.
In Old Ben Coal Corp. v. UMW Local 1487 (Old Ben Coal II),"' the Sev-
enth Circuit responded to the union's challenge. The court first summarily dis-
posed of the union's claim that it should have been allowed a grace period after
Old Ben Coal I to "absorb the impact" of that decision.92 Nor did the court look
favorably on the union's contention that strikes during that period should not
have been considered as part of a pattern of continuing misconduct.9 Simply
stating that it knew of no rule allowing such a grace period,94 the court took a
rather dim view of the union's actions. Indeed, finding a questionable union
motivation for the strikes as well as a likelihood of their continuation, the court
saw no alternative but the issuance of a permanent injunction. 5
The court went on to find that damages or disciplinary actions against
offending employees were inadequate remedies, since coal production lost by
these stoppages was lost forever, and disciplinary actions had in the past merely
provoked further stoppages and were "inefficacious."9 Therefore, issuance of an
injunction was justified.97
83 Obviously, the body of judicial precedent was slightly altered as each circuit court
handed down its decision.
84 It is perhaps of some interest to note that Justice Tom C. Clark, who sat by designation
in this case which was unanimously decided, had sat on the Sinclair Court and had there
voted with the majority.
85 457 F.2d 162 (7th Cir. 1972).
86 Old Ben Coal Corp. v. UJMW Local 1487, 500 F.2d 950, 952 (7th Cir. 1974) (Old Ben
Coal II).
87 Id. at 953.
88 Id. at 952.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 500 F.2d 950 (7th Cir. 1974).
92 Id. at 952.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 953.
97 Id.
NOTES
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
Addressing the union's overbreadth charge based on the Norris-LaGuardia
Act, the court initially found that the breadth of an injunction was to be
determined by the extent of the misconduct involved." It interpreted Boys
Markets as approving a broad injunction if merited by the facts and calculated
to aid the arbitration process between the parties as set out by their contract. "
The court found it significant that the terms of the injunction were actually
drawn from the contractual language of the parties' collective bargaining agree-
ment. It felt this obviated the vagueness question:
In essence the union is claiming it does not know what differences or local
troubles are arbitrable. We think the incorporation of the parties' own con-
tractual language into the injunction is of sufficient specificity to avoid the
complaint of vagueness. 100
The court additionally denied credence to the union's fear that it would
be subject to criminal contempt penalties for violations arguably not covered by
the arbitration clause. While noting that the union would have access to
declaratory proceedings promptly and accurately to determine the actual scope of
the clause in such situations, the court also expressed its opinion that "proper
consideration of circumstances of this nature will be given in any future contempt
proceedings."''
B. The Tenth Circuit
Following the seminal decision of the Seventh Circuit, the Tenth Circuit was
faced with a somewhat similar set of facts. In CF&I Steel Corp. v. UMW,10 2
the court reviewed an injunction forbidding the union from striking or stopping
work over disputes arising from employee suspensions, employee discharges, and
work assignments during the remaining life of the National Bituminous Coal
Wage Agreement of 1971.1' Within a four-year span, there had been eight
wildcat strikes at one mine, six of which the court determined to have been in
violation of the union's agreement not to strike over arbitrable issues. 4 After
hearing testimony on each of the eight strikes, the district court found that, while
four of the disputes involved were not likely to recur and thus were not appropri-
ate cases for equitable relief, disputes over employee suspensions, discharges, and
work assignments were likely to occur again unless enjoined permanently by the
court.'0 5
In the court of appeals, the union attacked the district court's decree as
being impermissibly vague and thus violative of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 954.
102 507 F.2d 170 (10th Cir. 1974).
103 Id. at 171, 172, n.3. See also note 6, supra.
104 Id. at 172.
105 Id. at 172-73.
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65(d)."' The court, however, found that, since only specific concerted activity
was enjoined by using "terms of reasonably specific content in the 'common law
of the shop,'" there was no incapacitating vagueness involved.'
The union also challenged the injunction on overbreadth grounds, and,
unlike the rather summary treatment afforded by the Seventh Circuit, the Tenth
Circuit's answer was more direct. First, the court looked to the Supreme Court's
standard on the breadth of injunctions, finding it basically to be an equitable
one dependent upon the circumstances of each case.'08 After reviewing the
history preceding the Supreme Court's decision in Boys Markets and evaluating
the relevance of that case to the instant one, the court concluded that it was
clear the Supreme Court had favorably considered the possibility of remedial
action directed toward future conduct in a proper case."' Moreover, the court
found that the employer's complaint adequately satisfied § 9 of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act; testimony at trial, offered and received without objection, had
dealt with the entire course of past conduct of the union, and there had been no
claim of surprise or lack of fair warning as to the issues being litigated."0 Thus,
citing the need for courts to seek an accommodation between the Labor-Manage-
ment Relations Act and the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the court approved this
prospective injunction as limited to the three types of disputes found likely to
recur.
11
The Tenth Circuit's approach thus differed significantly from that of the
Seventh Circuit. Whereas the latter had approved a prospective injunction
phrased as broadly as the contract language itself, the Tenth Circuit restricted
the injunction's scope to strikes over specific types of disputes affirmatively found
likely to occur again.
C. The Fifth Circuit
In the year following the Tenth Circuit's decision, the Court of Appeals for
106 Id. at 173. The opinion as reported in 507 F.2d states that the union's vagueness
objection was based on FED. R. Crv. P. 65(c), but this must be an error, since FED. R. Crv.
P. 65(c) deals with the giving of security by the applicant seeking an injunction. The correct
basis for the union's contention would be FED. R. Civ. P. 65(d), which states:
(d) Form and Scope of Injunction or Restraining Order. Every order granting an
injunction and every restraining order shall set forth the reasons for its issuance; shall
be specific in terms; shall describe in reasonable detail, and not by reference to the
complaint or other document, the act or acts sought to be restrained; and is binding
only upon the parties to the action, their officers, agents, servants, employees, and
attorneys, and upon those persons in active concert or participation with them who
receive actual notice of the order by personal service or otherwise.
107 507 F.2d 170, 173.
108 Id. at 174. The court of appeals here cites to NLRB v. Express Publishing Co., 312
U.S. 426 (1941), a case dealing with an NLRB order against an employer. The Supreme Court
is cited as saying:
The breadth of the order, like the injunction of a court, must depend upon the
circumstances of each case, the purpose being to prevent violations, the threat of
which in the future is indicated because of their similarity or relation to those urn-
lawful acts which the Board has found to have been committed by the employer in
the past. * * * To justify an order restraining violations it must appear that they
bear some resemblance to that which the employer has committed or that danger of
their commission in the future is to be anticipated from the course of his conduct in
the past.
507 F.2d 170, 174, quoting from 312 U.S. 426, 436-37.
109 507 F.2d 170, 176.
110 Id. See note 120, infra.
111 'Id. at 176-77.
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the Fifth Circuit heard an appeal from both a prospective injunction and a
civil contempt determination made thereon in United States Steel Corp. v.
UMW."2 Following a series of strikes over disputes involving arbitrable issues,
the district court issued a prospective injunction against the union phrased in the
exact terms of the arbitration clause of the collective bargaining agreement,"'
which again was the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1971.'1
When the union stopped work at certain U.S. Steel mines in a "memorial
protest" against the Alabama Power Company and its importation of coal from
South Africa, the district court held the union in civil contempt of its injunctive
order." 5
The court of appeals began its analysis by reviewing the Supreme Court's
attempts at an accommodation between the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the
Labor-Management Relations Act, concluding that it was clearly the purpose of
Boys Markets to vindicate the arbitral process. 6 But against this clear purpose
the court juxtaposed the narrowness of the Boys Markets holding, noting that it
had in the past emphasized the limits of that decision and that no reason existed
to alter that emphasis.'"
This caveat made, the court initially focused its attention on the prospective
injunction and only subsequently addressed the contempt issue. Although it
noted that the district court had found a series of illegal strikes and a pattern of
disobedience of regular injunctive orders, the Fifth Circuit nonetheless found it
improper to issue a prospective injunction. It grounded this holding on three
points. First, such an injunction violated the guidelines of Boys Markets, which
the court interpreted as clearly calling for ad hoc adjudication of each alleged
violation.' Though neither the Tenth nor the Seventh Circuits had heeded
this call, the Fifth Circuit supported its position by noting that not even Boys
Markets would enjoin every strike over an arbitrable issue. Indeed, a prospective
injunction for the life of the contract amounted to an order to work every day
and was thus "strongly reminiscent of 'government by injunction.' """ Second,
by being phrased in the broad language of the contract's arbitration clause, the
injunction failed under § 9 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act for lack of specificity.'
112 519 F.2d 1236 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 3221 (1976). The union
actually had filed an appeal of the prospective injunction before it was found in civil contempt.
The court consolidated both appeals and reversed the lower court on both issues. Id. at 1238.
113 Id. at 1239.
114 Id. See note 6, supra.
115 Id. at 1240-41.
116 Id. at 1241-43.
117 Id. at 1244. The court here cited to its decisions in Amstar Corp. v. Amalgamated
Meat Cutters, 468 F.2d 1372 (5th Cir. 1972), and Port Authority v. International Organiza-
tion of Masters, 456 F.2d 50 (5th Cir. 1971).
118 519 F.2d 1236, 1245.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 1245-46. § 9 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act reads as follows:
No restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction shall be granted in a case
involving or growing out of a labor dispute, except on the basis of findings of fact
made and filed by the court in the record of the case prior to the issuance of such
restraining order or injunction; and every restraining order or injunction granted in
a case involving or growing out of a labor dispute shall include only a prohibition of
such specific act or acts as may be expressly complained of in the bill of complaint
or petition filed in such case and as shall be expressly included in said findings of fact
made and filed by the court as provided in this chapter.
29 U.S.C. § 109 (1970).
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In so holding, the court directly rejected the Seventh Circuit's position. Finally,
this same ambiguity problem violated the procedural notice requirements of Fed.
R. Civ. P. 65(d).1 Use of the contract's own language simply did not give
adequate notice, since the parties themselves were often unsure of the meaning of
the agreement's terms. Indeed, the special nature of the collective bargaining
agreement was the very reason for the arbitration clause.'22
The court did note the Seventh and Tenth Circuit decisions on the prospec-
tive injunction question, but construed them as holding that any strike in viola-
tion of a no-strike clause raised an arbitrable issue as to whether the strike itself
was in violation of the no-strike clause. 2 ' The court tersely distinguished those
opinions by stating that in its circuit, at least, the strike itself was not an issue
arbitrable under the contract and thus the power of Boys Markets could not be
invoked.' 2'
Before discussing the Fifth Circuit's treatment of the contempt citation, it
is important to note that the dispute involved in that citation was not over an
arbitrable issue. As Buffalo Forge was later to reaffirm, a Boys Markets injunc-
tion can issue only if the strike sought to be enjoined is actually over an arbitrable
dispute.' Thus, when the only arbitrable dispute is as to whether or not the
strike itself is proper, Boys Markets does not apply. Here, although not a
sympathy strike to the extent of the one before the Supreme Court in Buffalo
Forge, the "memorial protest" was beyond the provisions of the arbitration clause.
The Fifth Circuit found it beyond belief that the contracting parties had intended
to arbitrate the question of whether Alabama Power Company should import
South African coal.'2 Thus, since the strike was not within the Buffalo Forge
interpretation, it could not be enjoined. With both the prospective injunction
held invalid and the memorial protest found unenjoinable, the union had violated
no valid order and was not subject to contempt.
D. The Third Circuit
Less than one year after the Fifth Circuit's ruling, the Third Circuit, in
United States Steel Corp. v. UMW,' announced its view on the prospective
injunction controversy. In the case before it, the district court had, within
one month, thrice issued injunctions against union strikes over arbitrable dis-
putes. '2 Seven times within the past year the employer had been forced to resort
to a § 301 (a) suit in the district court because of work stoppages over disputes
falling within the "Settlement of Disputes" procedure of the 1974 (and 1971)
121 519 F.2d 1236, 1246. See note 106, supra.
122 Id.
123 Id. at 1246-47.
124 Id. at 1247. The court appears to be correct insofar as it distinguishes between a
strike over an arbitrable issue and a strike which itself produces an arbitrable issue. See
Buffalo Forge Co. v. Steelworkers Union, 96 S. Ct. 3141 '(1976). But it seems to have erred
somewhat in stating the holdings in Old Ben Coal II and CF&I Steel on which it bases its
distinction of them. See the text accompanying notes 85-101 and 102-111, respectively, supra.
125 Buffalo Forge Co. v. UMW, 96 S. Ct. 3141 (1976).
126 519 F.2d 1236, 1247.
127 Id. at 1249.
128 534 F.2d 1063 (3d Cir. 1976).
129 Id. at 1067-69.
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National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement. 3 ' Faced with such an "unlawful
proclivity" on the part of the union, the district court had issued an injunction
not only directing use of the "Settlement of Disputes" procedure for the three
specific disputes that had occurred within the month, but also prospectively
prohibiting strikes, work stoppages, or picketing over any dispute defined as
falling within the contract's arbitration clause."3 '
The Third Circuit first dealt with the contention that the 1974 Agreement
differed from the 1971 Agreement in that the 1974 arbitration clause was not
broad enough to imply the required no-strike obligation. 32 Comparing the
language of the two Agreements, the court found them to be practically identical,
containing no significant differences. As to the implied no-strike obligation, the
court noted that the Supreme Court had construed most authoritatively the 1971
agreement as giving rise to an implied no-strike obligation in Gateway Coal.'
The contention that no Boys Markets relief was appropriate was thus rejected.'
Although the general applicability of Boys Markets was thus acknowledged,
the propriety of the particular injunction issued was not as clear. The court
noted that although the district court had found that, unless restrained, breaches
of the agreement would continue, it had not found that the likelihood of these
breaches was attributable to any specific action or lack of action by the union." 5
Noting that the Fifth Circuit argument that Boys Markets requires a case-by-
case analysis could not be lightly regarded,"' the court nonetheless observed that
the Fifth Circuit's broad ban of prospective injunctions was narrower than it
seemed. 7 The court found it appropriate here to sum up the conflict among the
circuits before proceeding with its own analysis:
Thus the Fifth Circuit seems to suggest that no injunctive relief against
future violations would be proper, the Tenth Circuit holds that a prospective
injunction against specifically identified types of future violations which have
in the past occurred is proper, and the Seventh Circuit holds that an in-
junction as broad as the contract is permitted. We think that a position
somewhere between the extremes is appropriate. 8s
As to overbreadth, the court found that there was nothing in § 9 of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act to prevent a federal court having jurisdiction under §
301 (a) of the Labor-Management Relations Act from enjoining a union's pat-
tern of conduct which it finds to have resulted in repeated and similar violations:
Once it has done so it should not be required to relitigate essentially the
same issue in a slightly different context over and over again. . . . The
court that has once determined in an adversary proceeding the meaning of
130 Id.
131 Id. at 1066-67.
132 Id. at 1069-71.
133 Id. at 1071.
134 Id.
135 Id. at 1075. The court also discussed various theories concerning the liability of the
parent union organizations for the activities of the Local. Id. at 1071-74. However, that
question is beyond the scope of this Note.
136 Id. at 1075.
137 Id.
138 Id. at 1077.
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a contract must have the power to protect the parties and itself from the
necessity for and burden of repeatedly adjudicating what often may be the
identical issue.189
Thus it disagreed with the Fifth Circuit view; however, it similarly found the
Seventh Circuit approach unacceptable for the instant cause at least, stating that
the evidence here would not support an injunction framed from the broad
contract language. 4 Instead, the court instructed district courts to make
specific findings as to what types of violations have occurred in the past and "to
limit injunctive relief to the likelihood of their recurrence, or to new and different
kinds of violations which may be expected to occur in the future."14 This ap-
proach closely paralleled that of the Tenth Circuit. The court ruled likewise on
the Fed. R. Civ. P. 65 (d) question, requiring the district courts to tell both the
union local and any parent organization enjoined which specific steps each must
take to prevent future illegalities and to insure compliance with contractual ob-
ligations. Thus, it differed somewhat from the Tenth Circuit's view that shop
terms were sufficiently specific; rather the court here read 65(d) as requiring
a delineation of prophylactic steps as well as actions prohibited. It also found
that injunctions phrased in the language of the contract did not promote the
collective-bargaining process, but instead were weapons which facilitated harass-
ment of unions by contempt citations' 42
Finally, the court addressed itself to an issue conspicuously absent from the
discussions of the other circuits. The Third Circuit observed that Boys Markets
conditioned the issuance of an injunction on an order directing the employer
to arbitrate.' Although it did not discuss the point at length, the court did
require any district court issuing a prospective injunction to include such an
order. Furthermore, that order was to be at least as broad as the injunction,
both in scope and in time. 4"
It is apparent that the Third Circuit's position4 5 on prospective injunctions
falls between those of the Seventh and Fifth Circuits. While it did find that
federal courts have the power prospectively to enjoin patterns of contract viola-
tions in § 301 (a) suits, in nonetheless held that the instant injunction was too
broad for the facts involved.' Beyond these findings, the court noted in a per
curiam opinion on the petition for rehearing that the issues involved in the
prospective injunction question "are exceptionally important and controver-
sial.""" Not wishing to delay a possible Supreme Court determination of the
matter," ' it declined the petition for en banc reconsideration. Observing that
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 1077-78.
143 Id. at 1078.
144 Id. at 1079.
145 Its position was not one unanimously arrived at, however. The concurring opinion of
Judge Rosenn, id. at 1079-83, and the concurring and dissenting opinion of Chief Judge
Seitz, id. at 1083-84, are cited infra as they are relevant to the analysis there conducted.
146 Id. at 1078.
147 Id. at 1084.
148 Id. at 1085. The court was concerned with the appeal of the Fifth Circuit decision in
United States Steel Corp. v. UMW, 519 F.2d 1236 (5th Cir. 1976). However the Supreme
Court denied certiorari. 96 S. Ct. 3221 (1976).
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three other circuit courts had reached differing opinions regarding the propriety
of prospective injunctions in federal labor law, the Third Circuit concluded that
"[o]nly the Supreme Court is in position to resolve this conflict."149
V. An Analysis of the Issues Involved in the Use of Prospective
Injunctions in Labor Disputes
It is apparent that until the Third Circuit's plea for Supreme Court resolu.
tion of this issue is answered, 50 the uniformity necessary to an effective federal
labor law is greatly jeopardized. In resolving the prospective injunction question,
it is imperative that each of the issues involved be carefully analyzed. Clearly
one of the most important issues is the function of the Labor-Management Rela-
tions Act vis-a-vis the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Perhaps within that context the
single most important point is one emphasized by the Supreme Court in Boys
Markets: The purpose of any attempt to reconcile seemingly conflicting laws
in this area should be to reach an accommodation that will further the national
policy favoring arbitration of labor disputes and the peaceful settlement
thereof. 5'
A. The Effect of Boys Markets and Its Progeny
Common to each of the cases before the circuit courts was the question of
the effect of Boys Markets on the prospective injunction issue. Initially, it must
be noted that the language used by the Supreme Court in Boys Markets can be
read as allowing prospective injunctions. The principles of the Sinclair dissent,
which the Boys Markets Court expressly adopted, 52 speak of the considerations
which district courts must weigh in deciding whether to grant a Boys Markets in-
junction; among other things, the courts are to consider "whether breaches are
occurring and will continue," whether they "have been threatened and will be
committed," whether they "have caused or will cause irreparable injury to the
employer."' 53
It is clear that the Court anticipated injunctive relief against future actions.
But merely saying that the guidance given to the district courts can be read this
way is not dispositive as to whether it should be read this way. That question is
essentially one of policy; to find the answer, one needs to search for policy pro-
nouncements in the opinion itself.
The search for statements of policy regarding labor dispute settlements is
not a difficult one, however. The Court speaks of its "consistent emphasis,"
despite Sinclair, to promote arbitration of labor disputes in accordance with
what it finds to be congressional policy.'54 It talks of the need for an immediate,
effective remedy for resort to the tactics that are supposed to be obviated by the
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 See, e.g., 398 U.S. 235, 241 '(1970). See also Buffalo Forge Co. v. Steelworkers Union,
96 S. Ct. 3141, 3147 (1976).
152 398 U.S. 235, 254.
153 Id. (Author's emphasis.)
154 Id. at 241.
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agreed-upon arbitration procedure 55 Indeed, is was because Sinclair cast "seri-
ous doubt upon the effective enforcement of a vital element of stable labor-man-
agement relations-arbitration agreements with their attendant no-strike obliga-
tions-" that it had to be overruled 58 Such language is certainly potent, and
it seems equally applicable to a situation where the mutual agreement to follow
a binding arbitration clause is broken by a pattern of strikes over arbitrable
issues. The arbitration clause is designed to obviate such tactics, and without a
prospective injunction forcing compliance with that clause there is no immediate
and effective remedy. The Court seems readily to acknowledge this, noting that
an award of'damages after settlement of a dispute is no substitute for an im-
mediate halt to an illegal strike. Furthermore, such actions for damages
prosecuted during or after a dispute are likely only to aggravate the industrial
strife, thereby delaying settlement and tending to frustrate a peaceful attempt to
resolve the dispute."5 7
Any attempt to "extend" Boys Markets beyond the fact pattern of that
case is met by the Court's own characterization of its holding as a narrow one.
Similarly restrictive is its statement that injunctive relief is not appropriate in
every case of a strike over an arbitrable grievance. 5 The Fifth Circuit seized
upon these statements in interpreting Boys Markets as calling for a case-by-case
adjudication. 5 ' It fortified its reasoning in this regard by noting that the language
of the Boys Markets guidelines, compelling district courts to consider "whether
breaches are occurring and will continue or have been threatened and will be
committed," is but a paraphrasing of the words of the Norris-LaGuardia Act
itself.' Thus that court of appeals read the above-mentioned phrases from the
Boys Markets opinion as requiring that the determination of the arbitrability of
a given dispute be made at the time that dispute arises.
This may well be a valid reading of those statements, yet the opinion must
be read as a whole, and the Supreme Court's disclaimer must be taken in context.
It is clear from the expressly adopted guidelines for implementation of the
Court's holding that an appropriate case for an injunction of a strike over an
arbitrable grievance is one where the parties are contractually bound to arbitrate
such disputes.' Thus, while the Fifth Circuit is correct that an injunction
should not issue merely because the strike is over an issue which is capable of
being arbitrated, the Court isl merely enforcing the mutual agreement of the
parties when it enjoins a strike that is over a dispute that both sides have bound
themselves to settle by arbitration. Such indeed is a correlative implication of the
holding in Buffalo Forge.'62 The self-asserted narrowness of the Boys Markets
holding is also explained by the Court in its own words immediately following
155 Id. at 249.
156 Id.
157 Id. at 248.
158 Id. at 253-54.
159 United States Steel Corp. v. UMW, 519 F.2d 1236, 1245 (5th Cir. 1975).
160 Id. at 1245, n.17. The Courts specific reference is to § 7(a) of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 107(a) (1970). Section 7(a) declares that no court of the United States
shall have jurisdiction to issue injunctions in labor dispute cases except after findings of fact
by the court "[t]hat unlawful acts have been and will be committed unless restrained or have
been committed and will be continued unless restrained...
161 Id. at 254.
162 96 S. Ct. 3141. See also 398 U.S. 235, 253, n.22.
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the narrowness statement; the Court says that it deals only with the situation "in
which a collective-bargaining contract contains a mandatory grievance adjust-
ment or arbitration procedure.""16 The fact that Boys Markets was extended
beyond its own narrow fact situation by the Gateway Coal decision,'" which
implied a no-strike obligation though none was expressed, lends support to this
interpretation.
Thus, insofar as there is a collective bargaining contract containing a
mandatory arbitration procedure,68 nothing in Boys Markets seems specifically
to exclude the use of prospective injunctions. On the contrary, the policies
avowed in Boys Markets and reinforced in Gateway Coal and by dicta in
Buffalo Forge would seem to encourage the use of a prospective injunction in a
proper case.
B. The Norris-LaGuardia Act Argument
The applicability of Boys Markets to prospective injunctions is by no means
the only issue, however. The Court itself said in Boys Markets: "We do not
undermine the vitality of the Norris-LaGuardia Act."'166 It is this statement,
coupled with the fact that the Supreme Court sought to accommodatePe' the
Norris-LaGuardia and Labor-Management Relations Acts rather than sub-
jugate one to the other, that seems to put the force of the Supreme Court behind
arguments against prospective injunctions based on the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
One thing is clear from the outset. In order to escape the prohibition of §
4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, an injunction of any type must meet the tests
outlined by the Court in Boys Markets. Since that decision is the authoritative
interpretation of § 4, any argument based on that section is really an argument
based on Boys Markets, and the direct applicability of that decision to prospective
injunctions has been discussed above. However, insofar as Norris-LaGuardia
arguments are based on § 9 of that Act, Boys Markets applies by analogy only.
The requirement of § 9168 most relevant to attacks on prospective injunc-
tions, and thus to this analysis, is its allowance of injunctions only as to specific
acts complained of and expressly found as facts by the court. 69 Thus argu-
ments based on overbreadth rely on § 9 for support.
It is appropriate here to note the distinction between overbreadth and
vagueness in the context of this discussion. As phrased by the Fifth Circuit:
Analytically, the broadness of an injunction refers to the range of proscribed
activity, while vagueness refers [to] the particularity with which the pro-
scribed activity is described .... "Vagueness" is a question of notice, i.e.
procedural due process, and "broadness" is a matter of substantive law. 70
163 398 U.S. 235, 253.
164 414 U.S. 368 (1974).
165 The other requirements must of course be met as well. See the text accompanying notes
66-74, supra.
166 398 U.S. 235, 253.
167 See, e.g., id. at 241, 249. See also Buffalo Forge Co. v. Steelworkers Union, 96 S.
Ct. 3141, 3147 (1976).
168 29 U.S.C. § 109 (1970). For the text of § 9, see note 120, supra.
169 Id.
170 United States Steel Corp. v. UMW, 519 F.2d 1236, 1246, n.19 (5th Cir. 1975).
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Section 9 arguments are thus substantive in nature. They claim that an injunc-
tion which prohibits more than specific acts expressly included in the court's
findings of fact is too broad. On the other hand, arguments premised on Rule
65(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are procedural, and claim that
the prospective injunction is so vague as to fail to give the specific notice required
by that rule.
There is indeed some merit to the argument based on the specificity re-
quirement of § 9. Clearly, it is difficult to understand how strikes which have
not yet occurred, over disputes which have not yet arisen, can possibly be in-
cluded in express findings of fact. When considered together with a view of
Boys Markets that requires an ad hoc determination of the arbitrability of each
dispute,171 the § 9 argument does seem to bar prospective injunctions.
There is, however, a conflict among statutory provisions in this area.
Section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 72 as interpreted by the
Supreme Court,1 73 empowers district courts to enjoin strikes arising out of the
disputes between unions and employers. Given that Boys Markets worked the
appropriate accommodation between § 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Actf 74 and the
policy underlying § 301,1.75 the relevant inquiry here is as to the degree of ac-
commodation necessary between § 301 and § 9.
The policy behind the Supreme Court's construction of § 301 in Boys
Markets is clear. As interpreted in Buffalo Forge, it is "to implement the strong
congressional preference for the private dispute settlement mechanisms agreed
upon by the parties."7 To the extent that the specificity requirement of § 9
prevents the granting of an "immediate, effective remedy" for a breach of a
contract containing a binding arbitration clause, it conflicts with the policy of
§ 301, and some accommodation appears necessary.
The Supreme Court has allocated to the courts the task of reconciling older
statutes with the more recent ones. 77 In working such an interpretive accommoda-
tion, "consideration must be given to the total corpus of pertinent law and the
policies that inspired ostensibly inconsistent provisions.""' Thus district courts, in
§ 301 suits, must determine whether the dispute over which the union is
striking is arbitrable rather than the merits of the dispute.179 In other words,
district courts are to determine whether the dispute in question falls within the
mandatory arbitration provision that must be present in the contract between
the parties before they may issue a Boys Markets injunction.' Following the
argument advanced by the Third Circuit,' 1 once the district court has made an
171 See United States Steel Corp. v. UMW, 519 F.2d 1236, 1245 (1975).
172 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1970).
173 Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970). See also Gateway
Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368 (1974), where the Court stated: "... § 301(a) empowers a
federal court to enjoin violations of a contractual duty not to strike." Id. at 381.
174 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1970).
175 See the text accompanying note 176, infra.
176 96 S. Ct. at 3147.
177 Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 251 (1970).
178 Id. at 250.
179 See, e.g., the Steelworkers Union v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581-
82.
180 398 U.S. 235, 254.
181 United States Steel Corp. v. UMW, 534 F.2d 1063, 1077 (1976).
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affirmative finding that a specific type of dispute, or a specific pattern of conduct,
falls within the arbitration clause of the contract and that -strikes over such
disputes are likely to recur, nothing in the language of § 9 would seem to require
the court to make the same determination over and over again.
Given the Supreme Court's direction to consider the total corpus of
pertinent law, it is useful to review the Court's own analogy to court-issued
injunctions. In delineating the appropriate scope of an NLRB order against
an employer, the Court noted:
The breadth of the order, like the injunction of a court, must depend upon
the circumstances of each case, the purpose being to prevent violations, the
threat of which in the future is indicated because of their similarity or re-
lation to those unlawful acts which the Board has found to have been com-
mitted by the employer in the past.... To justify an order restraining other
violations it must appear that they bear some resemblance to that which the
employer has committed or that danger of their commission in the future is
to be anticipated from the course of his conduct in the past.182
The Supreme Court appears to tie the appropriate breadth of an injunction to
the circumstances in each case and the violations to be prevented. Thus, it would
seem that the degree of specificity required by § 9 must also be tied to the
circumstances of each case and to the type of relief which would best effectuate
the policies behind the Court's construction of § 301. Section 9 need not be
sacrificed to accomplish this. It must be recognized, however, that the essential
finding which the court must make here is that the type of strikes sought to be
enjoined involves an arbitrable dispute." 3 The § 9 specificity requirement may
be met if the court finds a specific type of dispute to be arbitrable under the
contract's binding arbitration clause. An injunction phrased so as to be broad
enough to cover future strikes over that specific type of dispute may well match
both the Supreme Court's view on the breadth of injunctions and the specificity
requirement of § 9.
An accommodation of § 9's requirements to the peculiarities of a prospective
Boys Markets injunction case would not necessarily "undermine the vitality" of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act. The key word in the Supreme Court's statement is
"vitality."' 14 As stated by that Court, the "central purpose" of the Act is "to
foster the growth and viability of labor organizations."'8 5 The Act's "vitality"
is inseparable from its "central purpose," and the words of the Court regarding
the effect on that central purpose of granting Boys Markets injunctions are
equally applicable here. That central purpose "is hardly retarded-if anything,
this goal is advanced-by a remedial device that merely enforces the obligation
that the union freely undertook under a specifically enforceable agreement to
submit disputes to arbitration."'86 Thus, following the Supreme Court's own
guidelines, § 9 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act may be interpreted to meet the
peculiarities of the court's duties in a prospective Boys Markets injunction case
182 NLRB v. Express Publishing Co., 312 U.S. 426, 436-37 (1941).
183 See note 179, supra.
184 See the text accompanying note 166, supra.
185 Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 252 (1970).
186 Id.
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without vitiating either its specificity requirement or the central purpose of the
Act itself. The avowed policy favoring peaceful resolution of labor disputes by
means mutually agreed upon by the parties, and the Supreme Court's other
reasoning in the Boys Markets line of cases, seem to mandate such an accommoda-
tion.
C. The Argument Based on Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)
Whereas the § 9 argument turns more on questions of substantive law, the
problem arising under Fed R. Civ. P. 65(d)" 7 is essentially a procedural one of
notice and fairness. The party enjoined must be adequately warned as to what
type of conduct he must perform or refrain from perfonning to avoid being held
in contenpt:
The judicial contempt power is a potent weapon. When it is founded upon
a decree too vague to be understood, it can be a deadly one. Congress
responded to that danger by requiring that a federal court frame its orders
so that those who must obey them will know what the court intends to re-
quire and what it means to forbid. ... We do not deal here with a viola-
tion of a court order by one who fully understands its meaning but chooses
to ignore its mandate. We deal instead with acts alleged to violate a decree
that can only be described as unintelligible.18 s
The question, then, is one of intelligibility. So phrased, it squarely focuses
on use of the parties' contractual language, for there would seem to be no real
Rule 65(d) notice problem when strikes over specific, named types of disputes
are enjoined, as the union would adequately be put on notice."8 9 The problem
most graphically arises when, by using contract language, the court in effect tells
the union merely not to strike over any arbitrable issue. Such was the effect, for
example, of the order approved by the Seventh Circuit in Old Ben Coal H."'0
But by so phrasing an injunction in the very language of the arbitration clause
itself, the court is not only rightly refraining from immediately deciding the
merits of each dispute; it is indeed going so far as to abdicate its duty to de-
termine whether a particular type of dispute is arbitrable or not. 91 It is, in effect,
placing its own burden of decision on the shoulders of the one enjoined, forcing
him to decide rightly under pain of contempt. This seems to go too far.
The reason that the parties' own language may be effectively unintelligible
to them stems from the need for the arbitration clause itself. As the Fifth
Circuit points out, a collective bargaining agreement is often anything but a
precise document. 9 2 Broad agreements reached in collective bargaining sessions
187 For the text of Rule 65(d), see note 106, supra.
188 Longshoremen's Local 1291 v. Marine Trade Ass'n, 389 U.S. 64-, 76 (1967).
189 See, e.g., CF&I Steel Corp. v. UMW, 507 F.2d 170 (10th Cir. 1974). The Tenth
Circuit found that an injunction against "specific concerted activity, namely 'strike, work
stoppage, interruption of work, or picketing at the Allen mine'" used "terms of reasonably
specific content in the 'common law of the shop."' Id. at 173.
190 500 F.2d 950 (7th Cir. 1974). The Fifth Circuit, in its United States Steel Corp.
decision, quotes the exact language of the prospective injunction and italicizes the words taken
directly from the collective bargaining agreement. 519 F.2d at 1239.
191 See the text accompanying note 179, supra.
192 519 F.2d 1236, 1246.
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may be left to the arbitration process for application to particular circumstances.
"Indeed, the special nature of the collective bargaining agreement is the very
reason for the arbitration clause." '
Thus, it would seem that, as a bare minimum, the notice requirements of
Rule 65(d) would require more specificity as to the type of acts enjoined than
is given by the broad language likely to be found in a collectively bargained
arbitration clause. Equitable considerations, however, may arguably allow the
imposition of a broad, contract-language prospective injunction in a proper
case. If the court were specifically to find that a union's pattern of conduct was
too varied to permit specific categorization, and yet was clearly aimed at or had
the specific, primary effect of frustrating the arbitration clause and causing ir-
reparable injury to the employer, that court may well find it appropriate to use
the arbitration clause's own language in prospectively enjoining the urion from
such a course of conduct. In such a case, however, the court should allow the
union a fair chance to seek declaratory judgments on specific disputes as they
arise. 94 The employer seeking such a prospective injunction would of course
have to meet all the Boys Markets requirements,' one of which is a showing
that he will suffer more from the denial of an injunction than will the union
from its issuance.
It is especially in connection with this last mentioned requirement that the
practical effect of such an extraordinary injunction must be considered. When
a prospective injunction is issued, the union pays heavily by losing much of the
effectiveness of its strike threat. As to any disputes arguably within the arbitra-
tion clause of the collective bargaining agreement, the union would have to seek
a declaratory judgment from the court, hoping it would state that the dispute in
question was not one covered by the arbitration clause. A strike then over that
dispute would not be barred by the standing prospective injunction. Such public
notice of its intent to strike, however, would eliminate any element of surprise
the union might otherwise have in its favor. This would allow the employer and
its customers to stockpile. While the amount of stockpiling possible would vary
in direct proportion to the speed with which a declaratory judgment might be
rendered, a union's right to strike is nonetheless curtailed, and when the par-
ticular dispute is found to lie outside of the arbitration clause and thus outside
of the injunction, that right is wrongly curtailed. Thus, procedural problems
can result in substantive wrongs.
Undoubtedly, then, the burden of proof that the employer will suffer more
from denial than will the union from issuance would be a heavy one. Yet a
court may be willing to find Rule 65(d) satisfied even in such an admittedly
extraordinary situation by holding that, given the circumstances and the
equities involved, the order did describe "in reasonable detail' 9" the act or acts
sought to be restrained. The reason behind such an extreme "interpretation" of
193 Id.
194 See United States Steel Corp. v. UMW, 534 F.2d 1063, 1083 (3d Cir. 1976) (Rosenn,
3., concurring.) See also Old Ben Coal Corp. v. UMW Local 1487, 500 F.2d 950, 953-54 (7th
Cir. 1974).
195 See the text accompanying notes 66-74, supra.
196 FaD. R. Civ. P. 65(d). See also 534 F.2d 1063, 1082-83 and footnotes (Rosenn, J.,
concurring).
(December 1976]
[Vol. 52:307]
Fed. R. Civ. P. 65 (d) is an important one, for in a sense it is one which underlies
the very concept of prospective injunctions.
The issuance of a prospective injunction has the effect of shifting the burden
and expense of seeking court action to the party whose course of conduct has
specifically been found to be aimed at frustrating the mutually agreed-upon
contract and to be in violation thereof. Presumably, if all the substantive re-
quirements for a Boys Markets injunction' 97 have been met, only a union found
to have been abusing the protection afforded it by such laws as the Norris-
LaGuardia Act through a continuing repudiation of its own binding agreement
will be prospectively enjoined. Having failed to convince the court not only
that it did not violate the law in the past, but also that it is not likely to do so in
the future, part of the remedial obligation imposed on the union may be the
requirement that it seek the court's permission in the form of a declaratory judg-
ment before it strikes over a dispute.
It should be noted here that the dispute must be at least arguably within
the binding arbitration clause for the court to be concerned with it. 9 If it is not,
the prospective injunction does not apply. Only one significant aspect of the
situation is thus changed. Whereas previously the employer bore the burden of
seeking court action when there was a strike over an issue arguably within the
agreed-upon clause, now the union must bear that burden as a result of its con-
tinued transgressions. Before this burden of seeking court relief would fall to
the union, however, the court would have already found the union not only to
be in violation of its own agreement but likely willfully to remain so. To the
extent that a prospective injunction enjoined future strikes over specific types of
disputes, only to that same extent would the burden of seeking court action
shift to the union.
D. The Need for an Order Compelling the Employer to Arbitrate
The same considerations of fairness, however, that serve to justify the shift of
the burden of going to court also require that the union be adequately protected
against employer abuse of the prospective injunction. Although an order com-
pelling the employer to arbitrate as a condition of the injunction is dearly
mandated by Boys Markets,'99 it is apparent that a number of injunctions sup-
posedly following Boys Markets do not contain an explicit order to arbitrate2 0°
While such laxity may be excusable in some situations,2O' where a prospective
injunction is issued it is imperative that the employer also be ordered to arbi-
trate. 2 Were such an order not issued, the employer would have little incentive
to proceed expeditiously with the arbitration process. He would have his in-
junction against the union, and should the union become frustrated with his
delaying of any dispute's arbitration, he would have the power of contempt on
197 See note 195, supra.
198 The statement is a corollary to the "presumption of arbitrability," for the application
of which see Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368 (1974).
199 398 U.S. 235, 254.
200 See J. Axelrod, The Application of the Boys Markets Decision in the Federal Courts,
16 B.C.IND.&Com.L.Rxv. 893, 938-40 (1975).
201 See United States Steel Corp. v. UMW, 534 F.2d 1063, 1078 (3d Cir. 1976).
202 Id.
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his side to keep the union working regardless of his unwillingness to arbitrate.
The simultaneous issuance of an order against the employer that required him to
arbitrate as a condition of the injunction would, however, give the union the
protection against abuse that it has a right to expect.
If the issuance of any prospective injunction were routinely coupled with
such an order against the employer, it would have at least three salutary effects:
1) Employers would not lightly seek such an extraordinary prospective injunc-
tion, since if they failed to abide by the concomitant arbitration order, not only
would the injunction dissolve but they would lie open to possible contempt
liability themselves. Thus, prospective injunctions would likely be sought only in
those situations where they are most appropriate, i.e., where no other remedy
will vindicate the employer's rights. 2) Unions prospectively enjoined would
have both a safety valve and a defense against employer abise. Even though
under an injunction not to strike over arbitrable issues, the union would not
lose bargaining power since both sides would be equally under the arbitration
obligation by the same pain of contempt. If faced with an attempt by an em-
ployer to utilize the contempt power in lieu of arbitration, the union could
defend by asserting that a necessary condition of the injunction had failed.
3) Courts would have more immediate and powerful leverage against both sides
to insure that the purpose of the whole process--the resolution of disputes
through the agreed-upon arbitration procedure-would indeed be realized.
VI. Conclusion
While is is desirable that federal law be uniformly applied throughout the
land, in the context of labor disputes a uniform position is especially important.
The following quote from the Supreme Court's Lucas Flour opinion may be
applied, at least by analogy, to the current situation existing among the forums
governed by the conflicting courts of appeals:
More important, the subject matter of § 301 (a) "is peculiarly one that calls
for uniform law." . . .Because neither party could be certain of the rights
which it had obtained or conceded, the process of negotiating an agreement
would be made immeasurably more difficult by the necessity of trying to
formulate contract provisions in such a way as to contain the same meaning
under two or more systems of law which might someday be invoked in
enforcing the contract. . . . Indeed, the existence of possibly conflicting
legal concepts might substantially impede the parties' willingness to agree
to contract terms providing for final arbitral or judicial resolution of
disputes. 203
Clearly a result such as this would itself be contrary to the avowed national
policy favoring arbitration of labor disputes. Although the Supreme Court later
stated that a policy favoring uniformity "could hardly require, as a practical
matter, that labor law be administered identically in all courts, 20 4 it nonetheless
specifically excepted injunctions from that statement:
203 369 U.S. 95, 103-04.
204 398 U.S. 235, 246.
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The injunction, however, is so important a remedial device, particularly
in the arbitration context, that its availability or non-availability in various
courts will not only produce rampant forum shopping and maneuvering
from one court to another but will also greatly frustrate any relative uni-
formity in the enforcement of arbitration agreements. 20 5
From the review of the history relevant to the question, and from' 'the
analysis of the considerations involved, it is apparent that the needed uniform
position should be one allowing prospective injunctions if "the basic policy of
national labor legislation to promote the arbitral process as a substitute for
economic warfare12 6 is to be followed. Insofar as it has been shown above that
nothing in Boys Markets, § 9 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, or Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 65(d) specifically precludes the use of prospective injunctions
in labor disputes, the question of their use becomes one of policy. Since the
relevant policy considerations have clearly been shown to favor vindication of
the arbitral process over economic warfare, prospective injunctions should be
used to achieve this end when no other remedy will be successful. To insure that
proper use is made of this admittedly extraordinary remedial device, a con-
comitant order against the employer requiring him to arbitrate in good faith
will cause employers not to seek this remedy lightly, will provide a safeguard and
a defense for the union, and will allow courts more leverage to see that the end
result of all this is, indeed, a furtherance of the use of mutually agreed-upon
arbitration procedures to resolve labor disputes peacefully. Such an outcome, if
realized, would redound to the long-range best interests of both labor and man-
agement to achieve stable employment relationships.
The use of prospective injunctions, however, must be limited to those situa-
tions in which the court affirmatively finds that there is an abusive pattern
of strikes over arbitrable disputes, that regular injunctions will not provide ade-
quate relief, and that no other remedy is appropriate. While a national policy
favoring enforcement of binding arbitration agreements may in some circum-
stances mandate their use, prospective injunctions are too volatile a remedy
and too drastic a response to be lightly invoked. Their use places a heavy burden
on the issuing court to monitor their effect and to guard against their abuse. Lest
it be forced to heap contempt penalties upon frustrated parties, the court must
stand ready to provide declaratory relief swiftly and fairly in borderline cases.
Because of the adverse effects on the union's right to strike over non-arbitrable
issues-a right which even the availability of declaratory relief cannot wholly
protect-the court must not rely too heavily on the possibility of declaratory
relief. In particular, it must not be tempted to substitute declaratory relief for the
utmost care in framing the injunctive order to include only those abuses found
to be continuing.
Thus, the issues concerning the use of prospective injunctions in federal
labor law are significant ones. Significant too is the unsettled state of federal law
in this area. Yet, as the Third Circuit has said, "Only the Supreme Court is in
205 Id.
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position to resolve this conflict."2 ° Until it does so,"s the possibility that a single
contract provision will entail different obligations depending on the court apply-
ing the law will "inevitably exert a disruptive influence upon both the negotiation
and administration of collective agreements."2 ' In order to insure both pro-
ductive negotiations and peaceful administration, the "prayer for relief' voiced
by the Third Circuit21 should be expeditiously, and affirmatively, answered.
Michael James Wahoske
207 534 F.2d 1063, 1083.
208 The fact that the Supreme Court denied certiorari to the appeal from the Fifth
Circuit case, 96 S.Ct. 3221 (1976), should not be taken to imply the ultimate decision it will
reach. On the question as to whether a Boys Markets injunction should issue against sympathy
strikes, the Court thrice denied certiorari in such cases (see Note, Boys Markets Injunctions
in Sympathy Strike Situations: A Return to Pre-Norris-LaGuardia Days?, 6 Loy. CHi.
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